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LIST OF PARTIES 
Parties in the trial court included CBS Outdoor, Inc. ("CBS"), National 
Advertising Company ("National") (collectively "Appellees"), and Gene V. Crawford 
and Sherry T. Crawford, dba Val-Dev, L.L.C. (the "Crawfords"). 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err by dismissing the Crawfords' Complaint on the basis that the 
applicable statutes of limitation had run? The trial court's decisions regarding the proper 
statute of limitations is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See Nolan v. 
Hoopiiana, 2006 UT 53,119, 144 P.3d 1129; State v. Green. 2005 UT 9, % 15, 108 P.3d 
710. The trial court's determination of whether a statute of limitations has expired also is 
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Huntington-Cleveland 
Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^ f 11, 52 P.3d 1257. In reviewing such decisions, appellate 
court's accept the appellant's factual allegations and construe all reasonable inferences 
drawn from those allegations in a light most favorable to the appellants. See Sycamore 
Family L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass'n, 2006 UT App 387, ^  2, 145 
P.3d 177. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2). See Addendum. 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. See Addendum. 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. See Addendum. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a lease (the "Lease") which allowed Appellees to construct and 
maintain an outdoor advertising sign (the "Sign") on real property located at 
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the 
"Property). The Crawfords contend that Appellees breached the lease and the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interfered with the Crawfords' economic 
relationships, were unjustly enriched, trespassed on the Property, and committed an 
unlawful detainer. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Crawfords filed their complaint on August 31, 2006. R. 1-9. The Crawfords 
filed an amended complaint on September 31, 2006. R. 10-17. Appellees filed a motion 
to dismiss on the basis that the applicable statutes of limitations had run. R. 20-26. After 
oral argument, Judge Frank G. Noel orally granted Appellees' motion. On February 16, 
2007, Judge Vernice Trease signed the written order memorializing Judge Noel's oral 
order. R. 105-106. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December 1974, National entered into the Lease. R. 39-40. Brad Crawford 
purchased the Property under a general power of attorney on behalf of his parents, the 
Crawfords, who succeeded to the lessor's interest under the Lease. R. 28. He paid a 
premium because of the outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. Id. 
S I T 119776 1 5 
According to paragraph 3 of the Lease, the Lease commenced on February 1, 1975 
and continued for ten years. R.39, f 3. Paragraph 3 further provides that it continued for 
an additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the lessor 
on any subsequent Lease anniversary upon at least sixty days written notice. Id. 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the 
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or 
remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the 
Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the 
Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy 
of the building permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home 
Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the 
Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease 
beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its displays 
within the 90 day period. 
R. 40, K 9. 
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified 
National that they were developing the Property and that National must remove the Sign. 
R. 28. As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed the Sign. Id. On that date, the 
Crawfords sent National a second letter demanding removal of the Sign. Id. The 
Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building permit authorizing the development of the 
Property. Id. As of August 7, 1996, National still had not removed the Sign. Id. On that 
date, the Crawfords sent a third letter, demanding removal of the sign. R. 28-29. At that 
time, although they were not required to do so, the Crawfords enclosed a copy of the site 
plan for the development. R. 29. 
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On November 25, 1996, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, and to avoid any 
argument that the Lease had not been terminated, Martin S. Tanner, the Crawfords5 
attorney at the time, notified National and its attorney in writing that the Lease would be 
terminated as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. Id. This 
notification gave National 67 days notice of termination. 
Before terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an 
application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the 
Property. R. 29. Murray City granted the Crawfords' application an issued a permit for 
the Crawfords to erect their own sign (the "Crawfords' Permit") on March 29, 1996. Id. 
The Crawfords' Permit was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25, 1996. Id. 
However, on September 3, 1996, pursuant to Murray City's custom, practice and policy, 
Murray City extended the initial 180-day period by an additional 180 days, thereby 
extending the validity of the Crawfords' Permit to March 24, 1997. Id. 
On September 10, 1996, National represented to Murray City that the Lease would 
not expire during the initial 180-day life of the Crawfords' Permit. Id. Relying on 
National's representation, Murray City rescinded the Crawfords' Permit. Id. Murray City 
then learned that removal of the Sign and construction of the Crawfords' sign could occur 
within the extended-validity period of the Crawford's permit under Murray City's 
September 3, 1996, extension. Id. Thus, Murray City reinstated the Crawfords' Permit. 
Id. 
On August 5, 1996, Murray City issued a second permit to National ("National's 
Permit") which authorized National to erect a sign within 500 feet of the site authorized 
7 
by the Crawfords' Permit. R. 30. Murray City's zoning ordinances prohibit off-premise 
advertising sign construction within 500 feet of another off-premise advertising sign. Id. 
The signs authorized by both the Crawfords' and National's permits are "off-premise 
signs" and if constructed according to their permits, would be within 500 feet of each 
other. Id. 
National applied for its permit on April 30, 1996. Id. The Crawfords applied for 
their permit on March 5, 1996, and the Crawfords' Permit was issued on March 29, 1996. 
Id. Thus, at the time Murray City issued National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid 
permit that precluded the issuance of National's Permit. Id. Because Murray City zoning 
ordinances preclude the simultaneous existence of both permits, only one permit could be 
legally valid. 
In October of 1996, National sued for a declaratory judgment that its permit was 
valid. R. 30. On December 6, 1996, before the Crawfords had been made parties to the 
lawsuit, the trial court granted summary judgment for National and ruled that the 
Crawfords1 Permit was invalid. R. 42-43. The Crawfords' subsequent Motion to 
Reconsider was denied. R. 30. Later, National added the Crawfords as defendants by 
amendment and sought injunctive relief. Id. Once parties, the Crawfords requested 
summary judgment validating their permit. Id. The motion was denied. Id. 
Thereafter, the trial court granted National's second motion for summary 
judgment, relying on its initial rulings on the prior motions. Id. This Court reversed that 
ruling in June of 1999. Id. The case was remitted on August 9, 1999. Id. 
SLC 119776.1 8 
After remand, the Crawfords filed a second motion for summary judgment to 
validate their permit. R. 31. National cross-moved for summary judgment. Id. In a 
minute entry dated January 13, 2000, the trial court granted the Crawfords' motion and 
denied National's motion. R.45. However, the trial court never entered an order to this 
effect. R.31. Rather, in a minute entry dated February 16, 2000, after National objected 
to the proposed order, the Court vacated its January 13, 2000 minute entry to determine if 
service of process had properly occurred prior to the court's entry of summary judgment 
against the Crawfords in December 1996. R. 48. The trial court did so to address 
National's argument that the Crawfords had been properly served, that the trial court had 
jurisdiction over the Crawfords prior to its December 1996 ruling and, therefore, that the 
December 1996 ruling (which was reversed by this Court) was appropriate. R. 31. 
The trial court granted the Crawfords' subsequent motion for summary judgment 
on the issue of service of process. Id. This done, on August 28, 2000, the trial court 
entered an order granting the Crawfords' second motion for summary judgment on their 
counterclaim and denying National's cross-motion. R. 51-53. This was the first time the 
court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was valid. 
However, that validity did not last. National appealed the court's April 28, 2000 
order. Id. On December 6, 2001, this Court reversed, holding that summary judgment 
was precluded by issues of fact regarding service of process. R. 55-57. In doing so, the 
Court observed that "[sjhould the trial court find that service of process was not 
effectuated upon the Crawfords, [National's] claim necessarily fails." R. 57. 
^ C 110776 1 9 
After remand, the trial court held a trial on the issue of service of process. The 
parties stipulated this was the "sole issue to be determined at trial." After considering the 
evidence, the trial court found that service of process was not effectuated on the 
Crawfords. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment 
and Order (the "Order") on August 2, 2002. R. 59-62. Consistent with this Court's 
December 6, 2001 observation that National's claim "necessarily fails," the trial court also 
dismissed National's complaint, entered judgment for the Crawfords on their 
counterclaim, and again ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was valid. Id. 
National appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on October 9, 2003. R. 64-65. 
This was the first time the validity of the Crawfords' Permit was conclusively established. 
However, the Crawfords' could not take any further action in the trial court until this 
Court remitted the matter. This did not happen until December 12, 2003. 
On December 23, 2003, the Crawfords filed a Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, in which they requested leave to amend their 
answer and assert a counterclaim for damages resulting from National's breach of the 
Lease. The trial court granted the motion and, on October 19, 2004, held a trial. At that 
time, the trial court entered judgment for the Crawfords, concluding that National had 
breached the lease, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that, as a 
result of that breach, the Crawford's had been precluded from entering into a subsequent 
lease and had been damages in an amount exceeding $100,000. R. 71-75. 
National appealed. This Court reversed. R. 77-87. In doing so, the Court found 
that: (1) in addition to filing a motion for leave to amend, the Crawfords should have 
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filed a motion to re-open the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 or 60; (2) such a motion 
had to be filed within 10 days of August 2, 2002 under Rule 59, or within three months of 
August 2, 2002 under Rule 60; (3) because the Crawfords did not file their motion for 
leave to amend until December 23, 2003, it was untimely even if the Court construed it as 
a simultaneous motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60; and (4) therefore, the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to grant the Crawfords' motion for leave to amend. Id. 
Importantly, this Court did not discuss the merits of the Crawfords1 claims. Nor 
did it find, or even purport to find, that the Crawfords could not bring their claims in a 
subsequent and independent action because of statute of limitations problems. In fact, 
this Court did not even address applicable statutes of limitations. Id. 
The Crawfords filed their complaint on August 31, 2006, and their amended 
complaint on September 31, 2006. R. 10-17; 20-26. The initial complaint and the 
amended complaint are referred to hereinafter collectively as "the Complaint." The trial 
court granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, finding that the applicable 
statutes of limitations had run. R. 105-106. The Crawfords appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. R.107, 111-15. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim to which that statute 
applies has accrued. A claim accrues when it becomes remediable in the courts. A claim 
is not remediable until the plaintiff can prove all essential elements, including damages. 
The Crawfords' were damaged because National's conduct precluded them from 
erecting a sign and collecting rent. However, the Crawfords could not erect a sign or 
or n 11 n-7-7A 1 1 1 
collect rent without a valid permit. Thus, until the Crawfords' Permit was validated, they 
were not legally entitled to damages in the form of lost rent. 
In other words, the Crawfords5 claims against National did not accrue until their 
permit was validated. This happened at the earliest on August 2, 2002 (when the trial 
court first found the Crawford's Permit valid) or at the latest on October 9, 2003 (when 
this Court affirmed that ruling). Either way, the Complaint was filed prior to the 
expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 
The statute of limitations on a claim does not begin to run until that claim has 
accrued. See State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ^  17, 52 P.3d 
1277. A claim accrues when "it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the claim 
is in such a condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is 
established." Id. f^ 24 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In other words, a claim 
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. 
See Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, f 15, 28 P.3d 1271. Thus, a statute of limitations does 
not begin to run until all the elements that must be proven by the plaintiff at trial "are 
existing and may be established." Huntington, 2002 UT 75, f 24. 
National did not remove the Sign as required by the Lease. Instead, it applied for 
and obtained a competing permit. Because the two competing permits were within 500 
feet of each other, National's conduct prevented the Crawfords from erecting their own 
sign and collecting rent from advertisers. The Complaint seeks to recover this lost rent. 
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However, the Crawfords could not bring their claims until they could first prove 
they were legally entitled to collect rent. They could not collect rent until they first 
erected a sign, which required a valid permit. Thus, until their pemiit was validated, the 
Crawfords were legally entitled to damages from National for the lost rent. See 
Eleopulos v. McFarland & Hullinger, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 352, f^ 10 ("A breach of 
contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which is damages"); id., f 
18 ("Without proof of actual damages [a plaintiff cannot] sustain a present cause of 
action for breach of contract [and a court may] grant summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant"); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,1f 14, 20 P.3d 388 ("The 
elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance 
by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) 
damages") 
Consequently, the Crawfords' claims were not "in such a condition that the courts 
[could] proceed and give judgment" to the Crawfords until the trial court ruled that the 
Crawfords'Pemiit was valid. Huntington, 2002 UT 75, Tf 24. Prior to that time, the 
element of damage that the Crawfords had to prove at trial was not "existing" and could 
not be "established." Id. Thus, as a matter of law, the statutes of limitation on the 
Crawfords claims did not begin to run until a court issued a ruling validating the 
Crawfords' Permit. Id. 
That happened on August 28, 2000, at the earliest. On that date, the trial court 
entered an order ruling that the Crawfords' Permit. R. 51-53. This was the first time the 
trial court made such a ruling. 
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However, National appealed and this Court reversed. R. 55-57. Thereafter, on 
August 2, 2002, the trial court again entered an order validating the Crawfords' Permit. 
R. 59-62. This was the first time the trial court issued a ruling validating the Crawfords' 
Permit that was not reversed. 
Again, National appealed. This Court affirmed on October 9, 2003. R. 64-65. 
This was the first time the validity of the Crawfords' Pemiit was conclusively established. 
In light of the foregoing, the statutes of limitation on the Crawfords5 claims 
began to run on August 2, 2002, at the earliest (when the trial court first found the 
Crawford's Permit valid) and October 9, 2003, at the latest (when this Court affirmed the 
trial court's ruling). Accordingly, the statute of limitation on the Crawfords1 claims for 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
expired, at the earliest, on August 1, 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) 
(establishing a six-year limitation period on claims for breach of a written contract); CIG 
Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, f 20, 24 P.3d 966 (holding that the six year statute 
of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) applies to claims for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the implied covenant is founded on 
a written contract). The Complaint was filed on August 31, 2006. 
In sum, the Crawfords' claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied 
covenant were timely filed.1 Thus, the trial court erred when it dismissed the Complaint 
Additionally, if this Court finds, as it should, that the statutes of limitation did not 
begin to run until October 9, 2003, when the validity of the Crawfords' Permit was 
conclusively established for the first time, the limitation period applicable to the 
Crawfords' claims for interference with economic relationships and unjust enrichment did 
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on the basis that the applicable statues of limitation had run. The trial court's dismissal 
of the Complaint should be reversed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Crawfords respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. 
Dated October 22, 2007. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C 
By:^ 
Steve K. Gordon 
Michael S. Malmborg 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Gene V. and Sherry T. Crawford 
not expire until October 8, 2007. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (establishing a four 
year limitation period for tort claims). Further, the limitation period applicable to the 
Crawfords' trespass claim did not expire until October 8, 2006. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-26 (establishing a three year limitation period for trespass claims). 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — 
Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22; and 
(3) to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged 
on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or 
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, 
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to 
one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when waste or 
trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause 
of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting such waste or trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific 
recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time of its loss has a 
recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without 
the owner's fault, the cause does not accme until the owner has actual knowledge of such 
facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by 
the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in such 
case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake; 
1 n 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation 
is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action 
does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm 
suffered. 
STP 119776 1 18 
